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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with a single count of lewd conduct, Russell Parker
exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. At trial, the State did not call the alleged
victim as a witness; instead it relied primarily upon certain inculpatory statements
Mr. Parker made during one of his interrogations. Mr. Parker contends that the State
also relied heavily on the alleged victim's out-of-court statements-some of which he
contends were improperly admitted, and some of which he contends were improperly
utilized by the prosecution.
On appeal, Mr. Parker contends first that the district court erred in admitting
certain out-of-court statements attributed to the alleged victim, as reported through the
recording of one of Mr. Parker's interrogations.

Next, he contends that the State

engaged in multiple instances of misconduct-two of which related to the out-of-court
statements attributed to the alleged victim (offering evidence and arguments concerning
certain of those statements even though that evidence had been ruled inadmissible by
the district court, and arguing about the truth of the matters asserted in certain other
statements attributed to the alleged victim, even though those statements were offered
for a limited (different) purpose), and three of which were unrelated to the alleged
victim's out-of-court statements (commenting on Mr. Parker's invocation of his Fifth
Amendment rights,

offering "expert" opinion testimony concerning Mr. Parker's

truthfulness, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury).

Finally,

Mr. Parker argues that, to the extent that any of the errors complained of in this appeal
are deemed to be harmless, because the accumulation of errors deprived him of a fair
trial, he is nevertheless entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative error doctrine.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the summer of 2010, three-year old T.S. made statements which caused his
mother, and others, to believe that he had been sexually molested by Russell Parker. 1
(See Tr., p.207, L.19 - p.20S, L.1; p.209, Ls.2-S; p.223, L.14 - p.224, L.2; p.229, LS.10-

14; p.25S, L.20 - p.259, L.S; p.261, Ls.6-22; p.29S, L.19 - p . 300, L.1S; p.330, Ls.2-21.)
Mr. Parker had been a friend of T.S.'s mother, and had been T.S.'s babysitter for a
couple of months. (Tr., p.203, L.24 - p.206, L.1S; p.353, L.5 - p.354, L.354, L.6; p.355,
Ls.S-25.)
On August 24, 2010, Mr. Parker was interrogated for the first time. (Tr., p.231,
Ls.14-25.) During that first interrogation, he specifically denied having had any sexual
contact with T.S. 2 (See Tr., p.232, L.14 - p.233, L.22; p.360, Ls.10-25.) He was then
interrogated a second time in early September 2010. (Tr., p.233, L.23 - p.234, L.11.)
During that second interrogation, Mr. Parker admitted that he had had oral contact with
TS.'s penis, but explained the he initially did so accidentally (in attempting to blow a
raspberry on T.S.'s stomach), and then did so once more in explaining to T.S. what

Approximately three months before accusing Mr. Parker of inappropriate sexual
touching, young T.S. had made similar disclosures with regard to his uncle (his mother's
brother); however, T.S.'s mother chose to accept her brother's innocent explanation for
the conduct underlying those disclosures. (Tr., p.211, Ls.3-1S.)
2 His denials during the initial interrogation were consistent with statements made to
TS.'s mother before she contacted the police (Tr., p.207: L.19 - p.20S, L.1 ("[He]
said ... that he wouldn't do something like that, that that was disgusting."); but see Tr.,
p.359, Ls.1-20 (Mr. Parker denying the existence of this conversation)), statements he
made to her later during a "confront call" (Tr., p.230, L.11 - p.231, L.13 ("[H]e adamantly
denied any misconduct on his part."); Tr., p.359, L.23 - p.360, L.6 ("She asked if I had
touched [T.S.] multiple times. And I hadn't, so I told her no.")), and his trial testimony,
wherein he denied ever touching T.S. in a sexual way (Tr., p.353, Ls.2-4; p.363, LS.1416).
1

2

would be inappropriate contact. 3 (Tr., p.235, L.a - p.236, L.2; Ex. 1 at 01 :00 - 05:32,
09:05 - 10:20.)
On September 14, 2010, based on the statements made during the second
interrogation, the State charged Mr. Parker, by way of a criminal complaint, with a single
count of lewd conduct (by means of oral-to-genital contact). (R., pp.6-7.) Thereafter, on
October 19, 2010, the State obtained a superseding indiCtment charging the same
offense. (R., pp.33-34.)
Mr. Parker exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. That trial, which turned
out to be a two-day affair, commenced on April 4, 2011. (See generally R., pp.65-69,
70-75; Tr., p.6, L.1 - pA13, L.17.)
At trial, T.S. did not testify.

(See generally Tr.) Thus, the State's case rested

prirnarily on evidence of the statements Mr. Parker made during his second
interrogation, as well as various witness's references to T.S.'s disclosures.

(See

generally Tr.) With regard to T.S.'s out-of-court statements, the State offered copious

evidence of such statements, purportedly for the purpose of showing "context," i.e.,
what questions led Mr. Parker to make inculpatory statements during his second
interrogation,4 and why certain witnesses did what they did at various pOints. 5 (See Tr.,

At trial, Mr. Parker testified that the statements he made during his second
interrogation were not true; he explained that these false inculpatory statements were
the product of a long interrogation, bullying by the police, and impaired thinking because
of prescription painkillers. (Tr., p.362, LA - p.363, L.13; p.374, L.12 - p.375, L.20.)
Specifically, he testified that he felt that "the only way [he] could get out of there [the
interrogation], was making the admission" (Tr., p.363, Ls.8-10), and that he was "must
~iving them what they wanted so [he] could leave" (Tr., p.375·, Ls.16-20).
(See, e.g., Ex. 1 at 03:46 - 03:51 (detective telling Mr. Parker that T.S. said that "oh
yeah, Russ, he would suck my penis"), 05:34 - 05:45 (detective telling Mr. Parker that
T.S. said that Mr. Parker digitally penetrated his anus), 06:31 - 06:45 (detective
suggesting to Mr. Parker that T.S. had said "over and over and over again that you had
sucked his penis on numerous occasions"), 08:20 - 08:30 (detective suggesting to
Mr. Parker that T.S. had said that sexual contact had occurred multiple times), 10:43 3

3

p.163, L.3 - p.164, L.1 (prosecutor arguing that statements attributed to T.S. on the
interrogation video were not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein,
but to give context to the statements made by Mr. Parker during that interrogation); Tr.,
po 165, LS.3-15 (prosecutor arguing that other statements attributed to T.S. would not be
introduced, at least not to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein, although the
State would be offering evidence showing "that the witnesses that are on the stand did
ask the victim pointed questions and did respond to the answers [they] got").) However,
the practical effect of all of this evidence was to convey very clearly to the jury that T.S.

10:49 (detective suggesting to Mr. Parker that T.S. had said "he's done it to me over
and over and over"), 11 :12 - 11 :58 (detective telling Mr. Parker that "the report was
made in July," meaning that this was when T.S. reported the sexual abuse to his
mother), 20:28 - 20:55 (detective telling Mr. Parker "the thing he [T.S.] keeps saying
over and over is 'Russ put his mouth on my butt and my pee pee,'" and wondering aloud
why T.S. would say that if it was not true), 21 :57 - 22:07 (detective telling Mr. Parker
that "he [T.S.] keeps saying it happened over-you know, more than one time"), 22: 17 23:00 (detective telling Mr. Parker "we're gonna end up with his-a three-year old who
has no reason to lie or make things up-in fact what he's told us has been corroborated
by you ... but he's told us more than, than you're telling us," and that an observer
looking at this case "is gonna have problems understanding why he [T.S.] said these
things are true, and then you're saying 'yeah those are true, but not everything else he
said'''), 23:17 - 23:40 (detective suggesting that T.S. stated that Mr. Parker placed his
mouth on his buttocks).
5 (See, e.g., Tr., p.207, Ls.19-23 ("I tried to talk to Russ about it [the concern that T.S.
had been touched] ... , He would come into my work and I. tried to tell him that [T.S.]
had accused him of doing something."); Tr., p.209, LS.7-9 ("My son [T.S.] woke up with
a nightmare, screaming. And I needed to talk to his dad, and his dad told me to call [the
police]. So I did."); Tr., p.223, L.14 - p.224, L.2 (T.S.'s mother testifying that she began
to believe that certain changes in T.S.'s behavior were attributable to sexual abuse after
learning of his nightmares); Tr., p.229, LS.10-14 ("She [T.S.'s mother] confirmed that her
son, [T.S.], had made some statements that concerned her, and that she was worried
that he might have been sexually assaulted. And she listed Mr. Parker, Russell Parker,
as the possible suspect in that case."); Tr., p.258, L.20 -:- p.259, L.8 (T.S.'s uncle
testifying that, after speaking to T.S., he was "alarmed" and called T.S.'s mother to tell
her "she needs to keep a close eye on him and see what's going on"); Tr., p.261, LS.622 (T.S.'s uncle testifying that, in speaking to T.S., he asked, apparently referring to
biting someone's buttocks, who showed him that, and that when T.S. responded, he
called T.S.'s mother immediately); Tr., p.298, L.19 - p.300, L.18 (T.S.'s babysitter
testifying as to observing T.S. having a nightmare, hearing him talk in his sleep, clearly

4

had told multiple people that Mr. Parker molested him.

And, indeed, the prosecutor

explicitly asked the jury to infer as much: "We know that [T.S.] spoke to [his uncle],
spoke to [his mother], spoke to [his babysitter], and he told them things that made them
concerned enough that [his mother] separated [T.S.] from the defendant, Russell
Parker, and also serious enough that she called the police." (Tr., p.388, Ls.16-21.)6
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Parker guilty as charged. 7 (R.,
pp.74-75, 118.)
sentenced.

Approximately a month later, on May 26, 2011, Mr. Parker was

(R., pp.121-22, 126; Tr., p.414, L.1 - p.447, L.2.)

imposed a unified sentence of 30 years, with 10 years fixed.

The district court

(R., pp.122, 127; Tr.,

p.444, L.25 - p.445, L.2.) It entered is judgment of conviction on the following day, May
27,2011. (R., pp.126-28.)
On July 6, 2011, Mr. Parker filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.130-32.) On appeal, Mr. Parker contends that the district court erred
in allowing the state to offer T.S.'s out-of-court statements through the video recording
of Mr. Parker's second interrogation.

He also asserts that the State engaged in

numerous acts of misconduct-two of which related to T.S.'s alleged out-of-court

making out what he said, and reporting that information to T.S.'s mother and calling the
~olice).)

(See also Tr., p.392, LS.8-11 ("We also know, as I have already said, that [T.S.] says
things to his family, to [the babysitter], that make them remove [T.S.] from the
defendant's presence."); Tr., p.394, Ls.13-15 ("And again, [T.S.] made statements to
[his mother] and [his uncle] that make them move [T.S.] away from the defendant's
care.").)
7 Inexplicably, the trial transcript ends with the jury retiring to begin its deliberations; it
does not include the reading of the verdict. (See Tr., p.413.) Because the court
minutes from the second and final day of trial reveal no irregularities which could give
rise to an appellate claim, and provide a complete picture of the further proceedings that
day (i.e., they make it clear that Mr. Parker was, in fact, found guilty), Mr. Parker has not
sought to augment the record on appeal with the missing portion of the trial transcript.
Rather, he believes that the court minutes provide an adequate record of the final few
minutes of his trial. (See R., pp.74-75; see also R., p.118 (verdict form).)

5

statements (offering evidence and arguments concerning T.S.'s "sleep talk," even
though that evidence had been ruled inadmissible by the district court, and arguing
about the truth of the matters asserted in certain other statements attributed to T.S.,
even though those statements were offered for a limited (different) purpose), and three
of which were unrelated to T.S.'s out-of-court statements (commenting on Mr. Parker's
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, offering "expert" opinion testimony concerning
Mr. Parker's truthfulness, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury).
Finally, Mr. Parker argues that, to the extent that any of the errors complained of in this
appeal are deemed to be harmless, because the accumulation of errors deprived him of
a fair trial, he is nevertheless entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative error
doctrine.

6

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in admitting T.S.'s out-of-court statements through the
video recording of Mr. Parker's second interrogation?

2.

Did the State engage in one or more instances of misconduct, such that
Mr. Parker is entitled to a new trial?

3.

Was there such an accumulation of errors in this case that Mr. Parker was
denied a fair trial?

7

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer T.S.'s Out-Of-Court Statements
Through The Video Recording Of Mr. Parker's Second Interrogation

A.

Introduction
At Mr. Parker's trial, the State sought to offer copious evidence concerning the

out-of-court statements of 1.S., the non-testifying alleged victim in this case.

There

were three means by which the State sought to, and ultimately did, convey the contents
of T.S.'s statements to the jury:
•

through

the

audio/video

recording

of

Mr.

Parker's

second

interrogation, wherein Mr. Parker was repeatedly confronted by statements
allegedly made by 1.S. (see note 4, supra (citing portions of interrogation video
wherein the detectives directly relayed, or sometimes implied, the contents of
statements allegedly made by T.S.));
•

through the testimony of 1.S.'s mother and uncle, to whom 1.S.

allegedly made disclosures, as well as the testimony of a police detective, to
whom 1.S. mother reported 1.S.'s alleged disclosures (see, e.g., Tr., p.207,
Ls.19-23 ("I tried to talk to Russ about it [the concern that T.S. had been
touched]. . .. He would come into my work and I tried to tell him that [1.S.] had
accused him of doing something."); Tr., p.229, LS.10-14 ("She [1.S.'s mother]
confirmed that her son, [T.S.], had made some statements that concerned her,
and that she was worried that he might have been sexually assaulted. And she
listed Mr. Parker, Russell Parker, as the possible suspect in that case."); Tr.,
p.258, L.20 - p.259, L.8 (1.S.'s uncle testifying that,' after speaking to 1.S., he

8

was "alarmed" and called T.S.'s mother to tell her "she needs to keep a close eye
on him and see what's going on"); Tr., p.261, LS.6-22 (T.S.'s uncle testifying that,
in speaking to T.S., he asked, apparently referring to biting someone's buttocks,
who showed him that, and that when T.S. responded, he called T.S.'s mother
immediately)); and
'"

through the testimony of T.S.'s mother and babysitter, who

discussed T.S.'s "sleep talk," i.e., statements that T.S. allegedly made while
apparently having a nightmare (see, e.g., Tr., p.209, LS.7-9 ("My son [T.S.] woke
up with a nightmare, screaming. And I needed to talk to his dad, and his dad told
me to call [the police]. So I did."); Tr., p.223, L.14 - p.224, L.2 (T.S.'s mother
testifying that she began to believe that certain changes in T.S.'s behavior were
attributable to sexual abuse after learning of his nightmares); Tr., p.298, L.19 p.300, L.i8 (T.S.'s babysitter testifying as to observing T.S. having a nightmare,
hearing him talk in his sleep, clearly making out what he said, and reporting that
information to T.S.'s mother and calling the police)).
The admission of only one of these three classes of evidences-the recording of
the second interrogation-is challenged on appeal. 8

With regard to this evidence,

Admission of testimony concerning T.S.'s out-of-court statements to his mother and
uncle was arguably the subject of a defense "hearsay" objection, and perhaps even a
"prejudice" objection. (See Tr., p.i61, L.6 - p.i62, L.2i.) However, the State indicated
that "[t]he State understands the Rules of Evidence and doesn't intend to introduce
these statements of the victim," at least not "to prove the matter asserted," but only to
show that the alleged victim made statements and the witnesses reacted to those
statements. (Tr., p.165, Ls.3-i5.) In light of this explanation, the district court made no
ruling on Mr. Parker's general "hearsay" objection. (See Tr., p.172, L.23 - p.i77, L.17.)
Further, when the testimony in question was offered by the State, defense counsel
failed to object. (See Tr., p.207, L.i9 - p.208, LA; Tr., p.229, Ls.5-16; Tr., p.258, L.20p.259, L.i0; Tr., p.261, Ls.6-24.) Accordingly, Mr. Parker is not challenging the
admission of such testimony in this appeal. Nevertheless, as is discussed below,
Mr. Parker does contend that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct where, after
8

9

Mr. Parker submits that the district court erred because, although it gave a limiting
instruction in response to Mr. Parker's hearsay objection;9 it failed to balance the
probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect, as is required under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards
The applicable standards of review under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403

have been succinctly stated as follows:
Separate standards of review apply to issues of admissibility of evidence
under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. We freely review questions
of relevancy under I.R.E. 401 because relevancy is a question of law. On
the question of whether the evidence's probative value is substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudicial impact, however, we will overturn the trial
promising that he would not be offering 1.S.'s out-of-court statements for the truth of the
matters asserted therein, and gained admission of those statements through that
promise, he went on to argue those statements as substantive evidence of Mr. Parker's
guilt. (See Part 11(8), infra.)
Admission of testimony concerning 1.S.'s "sleep talk" during his nightmare was
also objected to by defense counsel. (See Tr., p.162, Ls.12-19; p.165, L.16 - p.167,
L.24.) Although the district court initially took the matter under advisement, it
acknowledged that the defense argument could have merit and it made it clear that it
wanted an opportunity to complete its research and make a ruling before the State got
into any "sleep talk" evidence. (See Tr., p.168, L.16 - p.169, L.11.) Ultimately, it ruled
that the "sleep talk" could not be admitted for any purpose "because their prejudicial
effect outweighs their probative value . . . . " (Tr., p.283, L16 - p.284, L.17.)
Nevertheless, the State offered both arguments and evidence concerning 1.S.'s "sleep
talk." (See Tr., p.192, Ls.14-22 (opening statement); Tr., p.196, Ls.2-9 (opening
statement); Tr., p.209, Ls.2-9 (testimony of T.S.'s mother); Tr., p.223, L.14 - p.224, L.2
(testimony of 1.S.'s mother); Tr., p.298, L.19 - p.300, L.18 (testimony of T.S.'s
babysitter).) Unfortunately, defense counsel failed to object to any of it. Accordingly,
Mr. Parker is not challenging the admission of such arguments and testimony in this
appeal. Rather, as is discussed below, Mr. Parker contends that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct where he discussed, and elicited testimony concerning, the
nightmare "sleep talk" before the district court ruled on its admissibility, and when he
elicited further testimony concerning the nightmare "sleep talk" even after the district
court had ruled it inadmissible. (See Part II(A), infra.)
9 (See R., p.99 (Instruction No. 13(a), informing the jurors that the hearsay statements
relayed by the detectives during the interrogation could not be considered because they
"are not evidence in this case" and, further, suggesting that those statements could be
untrue because "police officers are allowed, during an interrogation, to make statements
which may not be totally true or may even be totally false").)
10

court's decision only for abuse of discretion. Where a matter is committed
to the discretion of the trial court, we conduct a three-tiered inquiry on
appeal. We consider whether: (1) the lower court r!ghtly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Waddle, 125 Idaho 526, 528 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer T.S.'s Out-Of-Court
Statements Through The Video Recording Of Mr. Parker's Second Interrogation
Mr. Parker objected to State's Exhibit 1, the audio/video recording of his second

interrogation, on the basis that it included hearsay statements of T.S. and was unduly
prejudicial. (See Tr., p.160, L.4 - p.161, L.22; p.172, Ls.6-22.) The State responded by
arguing that the statements of T.S., as relayed on the recording, were not hearsay
within the meaning of !.R.E. 801(c) because they would not be offered for their truth, but
rather to give context to the responses Mr. Parker gave during the interrogation. (Tr.,
p.162, L.24 - p.164, L.1.) The district court ultimately agreed, ruling that Exhibit 1 could
be admitted, subject to a limiting instruction. (Tr., p.169, L.13 - p.171, L.16; p.172, L.23
- p.175, L.5.)
Unfortunately,

however, the district court never addressed Mr.

Parker's

contention that the statements attributed to T.S. on the video were also unduly
prejudicial.

The district court reasoned that because the statements were not being

admitted for their truth, they were not "admissible evidence" and, therefore, were not
subject to the balancing test required by I.R.E. 403:
It is also unfair to the State to present a tape which is so totally chopped
up that you cannot understand the context of the interview. And in viewing
this interview, that's what I believe the circumstance would be in this case.
Sometimes you are just in a circumstance where you just have to
place context on the interview and the responses, and advise the jury that
11

this [is] purely for context. I mean, the courts have recognized that, and
that's why we have availability of the limiting instruction.
And the response with regard to balancing of 403, under 403, is not
an issue here, in this Court's opinion, because I specifically told the jury:
"This is not evidence."

"It's not evidence that you weigh." And as a result, there is-the
balancing test, in this Court's opinion, does not apply because I'm telling
them it is not evidence.
"This is not admissible evidence. This is not evidence you can use
to find guilt. The only thing this is provided for is context."
I don't know how much clearer you can make that to the jury and
balance the interests of both the defendant and the State, because both
parties are entitled to a fair trial.
(Tr., p.172, L.24 - p.174, L.22.)
Mr. Parker submits that that the district court erred.

Although the statements

attributed to T.S. on the video were not to be admitted for their truth, they were still to be
admitted.

Accordingly, they were still subject to I.R.E. 403, which provides that

"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... "
Because the district court failed to recognize that Rule 403 applied, and failed to
conduct the balancing of probative value versus unfair prejudice that is required by Rule
403, the district court abused its discretion. See Waddle, 125 Idaho at 528 (recognizing
that two of the tests for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion are
whether it perceived the issue as one of discretion, and whether it acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices); accord State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).

Indeed, the

Idaho Supreme Court has recently held that where the district court fails to analyze the
admissibility of a given piece of evidence within the proper framework, the district court
12

commits error.

See, e.g., State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010) (''To exclude

evidence under Rule 403, the trial court must address whether the probative value is
substantially outweighed by one of the considerations listed in the Rule .... The district
court here did not conduct that analysis. . .. Because it excluded the evidence without
conducting the analysis required by Rule 403, the district court erred."); State v. Meister,
148 Idaho 236, 241 (2009) ("The district court erred by applying the wrong standard for
admissibility of alternate perpetrator evidence, and therefore, abused its discretion.").
In light of the fact that the district court erred in finding Exhibit 1 admissible,
Mr. Parker submits that his case should be remanded to the district court for a new trial,
whereat the admissibility of Exhibit 1 can be determined under the proper standard.

II.
The State Engaged In Misconduct Necessitating A New Trial
Mr. Parker's conviction was not just a product of Exhibit 1; he contends that it
was also the product of five distinct types of misconduct by the State: (a) offering
evidence and argument which had been ruled inadmissible; (b) arguing hearsay
evidence, admitted for a limited purpose, for its truth; (c) commenting on Mr. Parker's
silence; (d) offering opinion testimony concerning Mr. Parker's purported untruthfulness;
and (e) appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jurors.
Because only one of these instances of misconduct was objected to by defense
counsel, and the lone objection was on an alternate basis than that which is argued
herein, Mr. Parker can only prevail to the extent that he can establish fundamental error.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224-26, 227 (2010). In order to establish fundamental

error, Mr. Parker must satisfy three elements: (1) the alleged misconduct violated one or
more of his un-waived constitutional rights; (2) the error is plain (without the need for
13

additional information, such as information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision); and (3) the error was prejudicial, i.e., there is a "reasonable
possibility" that it affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226, 228.
For the reasons set forth fully below, Mr. Parker contends that each of the
alleged instances of misconduct satisfies the Perry standard. Accordingly, he requests
that his conviction be vacated, and his case remanded to the district court for a new
trial.
A.

It Was Misconduct To Convey TS.'s "Sleep Talk" To The Jury
At Mr. Parker's trial, the State sought to present evidence concerning a

statement TS., the non-testifying alleged victim, supposedly made while having a
nightmare. (See Tr., p.162, Ls.12-19; Tr., p.164, L.16 - p.165, L.2.) The statement in
question was along the lines of "No, Russ. No touch. Don't touch my pee pee." (Tr.,
p.283, Ls.6-12; accord Tr., p.162, Ls.12-15; Tr., p.164, Ls.22-24.) The State initially
sought to offer this evidence for its truth-that TS. did not want Mr. Parker to touch his
penis-which obviously would have suggested to the jury that Mr. Parker had previously
touched T.S.'s penis; the State initially reasoned that TS.'s statement was admissible
as an excited utterance under I.R.E. 803(2). (See Tr., p.164, L.18 - p.165, L.2.)
Defense counsel objected to admission of the "sleep talk" evidence as hearsay,
and pursuant to State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971 (1992), which held that "sleep talk"
is utterly irrelevant and unreliable. (Tr., p.162, Ls.12-19; Tr., p.165, L.19 -167, L.24.)
The district court acknowledged that the defense argument appeared have merit and
initially took the matter under advisement, pending its full review of Zimmerman. (Tr.,
p.168, Ls.16-18; Tr., p.169, Ls.8-11.) It also made it clear that it wanted an opportunity
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to complete its research and make a ruling before the State got into any "sleep talk"
evidence. (See Tr., p.168, L.16 - p.169, L.11.)
Ultimately, having reviewed Zimmerman, the prosecutor conceded that that case
was "good law" and "that the [sleep talk) statements would not come in as evidence";
however, he asked that he still be allowed to "bring those statements in for the effect on
the listener," i.e., why TS.'s babysitter called TS.'s mother, who then called the police.
(Tr., p.282, L.19 - p.283, L.15.) In response, the district court ruled that the "sleep talk"
was not admissible "for any purpose" because its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighed its probative value. (Tr., p.283, L16 - p.284, L.17.)
Nevertheless, the State offered copious arguments and evidence concerning
T.S.'s "sleep talk," and thereby conveyed the substance of that "sleep talk" to the jury.10
The State first did so after the district court had made it cle.ar to counsel that no such
evidence or arguments should be given until there was a final ruling on admissibility.
Later, after the district court specifically ruled that the "sleep talk" could not be admitted
"for any purpose"-not even to show the effect on the listener, the State offered more
evidence on this topic.
The State began with its very first statement to the jury. The prosecutor began
his opening statement as follows:

10 Although the precise statement allegedly made by TS. was never quoted to the jury,
sufficient information about that statement was provided for the jury to infer that during a
nightmare TS. had made statements that revealed that Mr. Parker had molested him.
See State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 684 (Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing that a
prosecutor may improperly interject "inadmissible evidence into a trial" by conduct which
allows the jury to infer that which has been ruled inadmissible); State v. Christiansen,
144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (same). In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the
district court's ultimate ruling was not simply that the "sleep talk" could not be admitted
for the truth of the matters asserted therein; it ruled that testimony about the "sleep talk"
could not be admitted "for any purpose," including the alternative purpose proffered by
the State-to show the effect on the listener.
15

Folks, when [T.S.] called out from his nightmare, at that point his
mother, Vanessa, knew she needed to act. She called the police, and that
began the charges that bring you here today.
What was the nightmare?
'Nell, as the police investigation unfolds, it becomes clear that the
nightmare is that the defendant, Russell Parker, sexually molested [T.S.],
a three-year-old boy. And he did that by placing the three-year-old's penis
in his mouth. And he did it more than once.
(Tr., p.192, Ls.14-22.)

Moments later, the prosecutor continued with this theme,

promising to present the jury with testimony about the nightmare and the alleged "sleep
talk":
Joy [the babysitter], you will hear from. You will hear that Joy babysat [T.S.] ....
Specifically, what you will hear is you will hear a story where Joy is
watching [T.S.] and he has this nightmare. And you will hear her describe
his body language, how he was rolled up in a fetal position, how his hands
are shaking, and you will hear the cry out.
And based on that, Joy contacts Vanessa and says, "You got to do
something."
And that was the straw that broke the camel's back, Vanessa
involves law enforcement. She calls the police.
(Tr., p.196, Ls.2-9.)
This theory of the case continued with the State's firs't witness, Vanessa Marsh,
T.S. 's mother. Ms. Marsh testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. Did you eventually call the police about what your concerns

were?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What tipped the scale on that? Why did that happen?

A. My son woke up with a nightmare, screaming. And I needed to
talk to his dad, and his dad told me to call. So I did.
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(Tr., p.209, Ls.2-9.) A short while later, on re-direct, Ms. Marsh was questioned further
about the alleged nightmare:
O. Mr. Wollen [defense counsel] asked you whether you thought
that some of the changes in [T.S.'s] behavior were due to his age. Was
there some point-and you said that, yes; is that correct?
A. Yes.

O. Was there some point when that view changed?
A. Yes.

O. What were the things that made you change that view?
A. The nightmares, mostly ....

(Tr., p.223, Ls.14-24.)
Perhaps the most explicit evidence of the nightmare and the "sleep talk" came on
the morning of the second day of Mr. Parker's trial when, just moments after the district
court explicitly ruled that the "sleep talk" evidence could. not be admitted "for any
purpose"-not even to show the effect on the listener, the babysitter (Joy)-the State
called the babysitter to the witness stand and questioned her extensively on T.S.'s
purported nightmare, his "sleep talk," and the effect of each on her:
O. Now, a couple weeks later, there was something that happened
that was also alarming to you?
A. Yes.

O. And what was that?
A. [T.S.] had a nightmare.

O. Okay, without getting into anything he may have said, what did
you observe when you were watch ing that nightmare?
A. What I observed while he was having that nightmare was he was
in a fetal position-

O. Okay.

17

A. -and then he started shaking, like this (indicating).
Q. And did he say some things?

A. He did say some things.
Q. And did those concern you?

A. Yes, those did concern me.
Q. And based on what he was saying and what he was doing and
how he was acting, what did you do?

A. Well, when I couldn't take any more of what he was saying, I
scooped him up, woke him up, consoled him, and made sure he was calm
and comfortable, got him to watching some cartoons, and I called his
mother at work.
Q. Would you normally call her at work?

A. No.
Q. Now, you said when you couldn't take any more. Do you mean
this was very upsetting to you?

A. It was very upsetting.
Q. Could you understand what he was saying clearly?

A. Yes, I could understand what he was saying clearly.
Q. And you called Vanessa at work?

A. Yes.
Q. And did you-what did you do?

Without getting into anything [T.S.] might have said, what did you
tell Vanessa?
A. I said that we had some-that, you know, since he's both-at
this point both of our responsibility, because I was watching him at the
time, I said, "We have a problem and it needs to be addressed right
away."
Q. What did Vanessa do?

A. Vanessa finished up her shift, came to my house right away, and
we sat down, and we called the police.
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(Tr., p.298, L.19 - p.300, L.i8.)
Mr. Parker contends that State's evidence and arguments concerning the
nightmare and the "sleep talk" were plainly improper.

The initial arguments and

evidence on these topics, i.e., the above-quoted portion of the prosecutor's opening
statement and of Ms. Marsh's testimony, were offered in violation of the district court's
admonishment that no such evidence or argument should be offered until the court had
ruled on its admissibility, and the later evidence on these topics, i.e., the babysitter's
testimony, was offered in violation of the district court's ruling that the evidence was not
admissible for any purpose. And it is well-established that it is misconduct to simply
ignore the district court's orders concerning the presentation of evidence.

See, e.g.,

State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 683-84 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding misconduct where the
prosecutor phrased a question in such a manner as to allow the jury to infer certain
information which the district court had already ruled inadmissible); State v. Field, 144
Idaho 559, 572 (2007) (finding misconduct where there was an unresolved question as
to the admissibility of certain testimony, the prosecutor represented that the State would
seek a ruling on admissibility before eliciting such testimony, and the prosecutor failed
to seek a ruling on admissibility before eliciting the testimony in question); State v.
Martinez, 136 Idaho 521,524-25 (el. App. 2001) (finding misconduct where the district
court had ruled a certain medical report inadmissible (because it was hearsay) and the
prosecutor repeatedly attempted to elicit testimony from a police officer as to the
contents of that report); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 594-97 (Cl. App. 1995)
(finding misconduct where certain testimony was deemed to be inadmissible hearsay
and the prosecutor attempted to elicit it anyway); ct., e.g., State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho
53, 63, 67 (2011 ) (expressing concern at one point that the prosecutor "seem[ed] to
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have completely ignored the court's admonition to 'move on,' by immediately asking
another inflammatory question," and, at another point, finding that where a testifying
police officer "gratuitously and unnecessarily injected his clearly inadmissible opinion"
into the case, the State's conduct would have been held to be improper if it had been
challenged as such).
More than just being improper though, the prosecutor's misconduct in flouting the
district court's orders and offering inadmissible "sleep talk" evidence constituted
fundamental error, such that that misconduct may be reviewed on appeal despite the
absence of any contemporaneous objection by defense counsel. As noted above, in
order to establish fundamental error, Mr. Parker must show that: (1) the prosecutor's
misconduct violated one or more of his un-waived constitutional rights; (2) the error is
plain (without the need for additional information, such as information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) there is a "reasonable possibility" that
the misconduct affected the outcome of the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 228.
First is the question of whether the prosecutor's misconduct violated Mr. Parker's
constitutional rights. He contends that it did; he contends that his right to a fair trial and
due process of law

11

was violated when the prosecutor disregarded the district court's

rulings and offered evidence and argument concerning T.S.'s alleged "sleep talk."

Donnelly v. De Christoforo , 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (recognizing that where
prosecutorial misconduct does not directly infringe upon rights specifically guaranteed
by the Constitution (such as the Fifth Amendment right against compelled selfincrimination), it may violate the Constitution by rendering the defendant's trial unfair).
This is not a case where the prosecutor committed a technical violation of one of the

11

See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13.
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district court's rulings; here, the question of whether T.S.'s alleged sleep talk would be
admitted was a big one. It was part of an overall pattern of attempting to get T.S.'s outof-court statements in front of the jury.

(See Part I, supra; Part 11(8), infra.) Why?

Certainly not because it was critical for the State to be able to explain to the jury why
T.S.'s uncle called T.S.'s mother and urged her to keep an eye on T.S., why T.S.'s
babysitter called T.S.'s mother in a panic, or why T.S.'s mother called the police. All of
these facts are quite irrelevant to the question of whether T.S. was molested and, if so,
whether Mr. Parker was the perpetrator. 12 No, the prosecution in this case fought to get
the "sleep talk" evidence, and the other out-of-court statements attributed to T.S., in
front of the jury so that the jury would infer that T.S. himself had substantiated the
State's allegations against Mr. Parker.

Indeed, the State betrayed its true motive in

closing arguments, where the prosecutor specifically implored the jurors to infer that
T.S. had made statements supporting the charge against Mr. Parker.

First, the

prosecutor argued that, "We know that [T.S.] spoke to Austin [his uncle], spoke to
Vanessa [his mother], spoke to Joy [his babysitter], and he told them things that made
them concerned enough that Vanessa separated [T.S.] from the defendant, Russell
Parker, and also serious enough that she called the police."

(Tr., p.388, Ls.16-21.)

Next, in arguing to the jury that the State met its burden of corroboration under the
corpus delicti rule, the prosecutor argued that, "We also know, as I have already said,
that [T.S.] says things to his family, to Joy, that make them remove [T.S.] from the
defendant's presence."

(Tr., p.392, Ls.8-11.)

Finally, the prosecutor reiterated this

Although Mr. Parker is not claiming an evidentiary error (as the district court already
ruled the "sleep talk" evidence inadmissible), it is worth recalling the definition of
"relevant evidence." It is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 201 (emphasis added).
12
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argument a third time: "And again, [TS.] made statements to Vanessa and Austin that
ma[d]e them move [TS.] away from the defendant's care."

(Tr., p.394, Ls.13-15.)

Accordingly, the "sleep talk" evidence was extremely prejudicial-so prejudicial that the
district court correctly found it to be inadmissible, and so prejudicial that its admission in
contravention of the district court's orders deprived Mr. Parker of a fair trial and due
process of law.
The second question of whether the error is plain. Mr. Parker submits that this
question is easily answered in the affirmative.

Preliminarily, it is beyond cavil that

prosecutors have an obligation to comply with court orders concerning the presentation
of evidence. See, e.g., Field, 144 Idaho at 572. More importantly for purposes of this
case though, it is readily apparent that defense counsel's failure to object to the "sleep
talk" evidence and arguments was not a tactical decision on the part of Mr. Parker's
counsel. After all, counsel had specifically objected to the "sleep talk" evidence, and
had offered reasonably thorough arguments against it. (See Tr., p.162, Ls.12-19; Tr.,
p.165, L.19 - 167, L.24.)
The final question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
prosecutor's misconduct affected the outcome of Mr. Parker's tria/. Mr. Parker contends
that there is. As is discussed above, the "sleep talk" evidence and arguments were part
of a much larger pattern of getting TS.'s out-of-court statements in front of the jury so
that the jury would believe that TS. had substantiated the State's allegations against
Mr. Parker.

As such, the State's misconduct was extraordinarily prejudicial and,

therefore, satisfies the third prong of the Perry test.
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B,

It Was Misconduct To Argue Hearsay, Admitted For A Limited Purpose (To Show
The Effect On The Listener) As Substantive Evidence
Besides seeking to present the jury with T.S.'s alleged out-of-court statements

through Exhibit 1 and its "sleep talk" testimony and arguments, the State also sought to
present evidence of T.S.'s statements to other witnesses, incJuding T.S.'s mother. (See
Tr., p.161, Ls.6-22, Tr., p.162, LsA-11, 20-21; Tr., p.164, Ls.2-15; Tr., p.165, Ls.3-15.)
Defense counsel objected generally to the admission

ot

any such evidence, asserting

that it was hearsay and, arguably, also asserting that it was unduly prejudicial. (See Tr.,
p.161, Ls.6-22; Tr., p.62, Ls,20-21.) In response, the prosecutor addressed the hearsay
argument, asserting that any out-ot-court statements attributed to T.S. would not be
offered for the truth of the matters asserted,

Specifically, the prosecutor stated as

follows:
With respect to the second part of the Court's question, whether
other statements were made spontaneously or pursuant to questioning,
the answer is that those were made primarily pursuant to questioning.
The State understands the Rules of Evidence and doesn't intend to
introduce these statements of the victim. It does intend to talk about the
fact that the witnesses that are on the stand did ask the victim pointed
questions and did respond to the answers it got. But it doesn't intend to
introduce the statements that the victim makes to prove the matter
asserted,
(Tr., p.165, Ls.3-5.) Following that assurance from the prosecutor, defense counsel did
not push the matter further, and did not obtain any sort of ruling from the district court.
(See generally Tr., p.165, L 16 - p.177, L 16.)

During the trial, the prosecutor made numerous references-through argument
and the eliciting of testimony-to the out-of-court statements of T.S. (in addition to those
contained in Exhibit 1, and the references to T.S.'s sleep talk, both of which are
discussed above).

Initially, the prosecutor brought the matter up in his opening
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statement, twice referencing disclosures TS. allegedly made to his uncle. 13

The

prosecutor described the anticipated evidence concerning an alleged initial conversation
between TS. and his uncle as follows: "So Austin [TS.'s uncle] is concerned about this.
He separates the boys, and he asks [TS.] about it. And when he hears, he goes to
Vanessa [TS.'s mother], and says, 'Hey, you need to w<;:ltch out for this.

This is

serious.''' (Tr., p.194, Ls.13-18.) Moments later, he described the anticipated evidence
concerning an alleged second conversation between T.S. and his uncle: "So now Austin
is very concerned, and again he separates the boys .... And again he asks if [T.S.] is
okay. And now, based on what he hears, he goes to mom, Vanessa, and says, 'You
got to do so something. You got to do something.''' (Tr., p.195, Ls.4-12.)
During the evidentiary portion of the case, the prosecutor elicited testimony from
T.S.'s mother, Vanessa Marsh, about out-of-court statements allegedly made by TS.
Ms. Marsh testified as follows: "I tried to talk to Russ about it [the concern that T.S. had
been touched]. . .. He would come into my work and I tried to tell him that [TS.] had
accused him of doing something."

(Tr., p.207, Ls.19-23.)

A short while later, the

prosecutor elicited testimony from a police detective about the same, or similar,
disclosures (as relayed to him through Ms. Marsh): "She [Ms; Marsh] confirmed that her
son, [TS.], had made some statements that concerned her, and that she was worried
that he might have been sexually assaulted. And she listed Mr. Parker, Russell Parker,
as the possible suspect in that case." (Tr., p.229, Ls.10-14.)

As noted above (see note 1, supra), approximately three months before accusing
Mr. Parker of inappropriate sexual touching, young TS. had made similar disclosures
with regard to his uncle (his mother's brother). (Tr., p.211, Ls.3-18.) If the uncle were
T.S.'s real abuser, he would have had incentive to testify falsely against Mr. Parker.
13

24

Finally, the prosecutor elicited the testimony from TS.'s uncle, Austin Marsh, that
had been promised in the State's opening statement.

With regard to an initial

conversation between TS. and Mr. Marsh, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Okay. Did you ask [TS.] questions?

A. Yes.
Q. And without getting into the specifics of what [TS.] said, were

you alarmed at the response?
A. Yes.
Q. And so you called your sister?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you tell her?
A. I told her that I'm concerned with [TS.'s] behavior, and told her
what had happened.
And she came there, and I told her she needs to keep a close eye
on him and see what's going on.
(Tr., p.258, L.20 - p.259, L.8.)

Next, Mr. Marsh was questioned about a second

conversation with TS. a few weeks later:
Q. What did you do next?

A. I asked him [TS.] questions.
Q. And how did you-how did you phrase these questions?
A. I asked him, "Who would have shown you anything like that," I
said, "other than people that are changing your diaper?"
I mean, I don't-I didn't mention any names, anybody's name
whatsoever, because I didn't want him to have a quick cop-out and just
say, "Oh, yeah, that was what happened."
Q. And so based on-or did [TS.] respond to you?

A. Yes.
Q. And what did you do after you heard his response?
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A Called my sister immediately.
(Tr., p.261, Ls.6-22.)
As noted, all of the foregoing was supposedly offered only to show the effects on
the various listeners, not to prove the truth of any disclosures attributed to TS. (See
Tr., p.165, Ls.3-15.) However, the prosecutor implied repeatedly in his summation that
the jury should: (a) infer that TS. made damning disclosures concerning Mr. Parker,
and (b) believe those disclosures for their truth. (Tr., p.388, Ls.16-21 ("We know that
[T.S.] spoke to Austin, spoke to Vanessa, spoke to Joy [the babysitter], and he told
them things that made them concerned enough that Vanessa separated [TS.] from the
defendant, Russell Parker, and also serious enough that she called the police."); Tr.,
p.392, LS.8-11 ("We also know, as I have already said, that [TS.] says things to his
family, to Joy, that make them remove [TS.] from the defendant's presence."); Tr.,
p.394, Ls.13-15 (HAnd again, [TS.] made statements to Vanessa and Austin that make
them move [T.S.] away from the defendant's care.").)
Mr. Parker contends that this was misconduct. It is well-established under Idaho
law that, where trial evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, it is improper for a party
to argue it for a different purpose. For example, in State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496
(1999), the Supreme Court held that where certain eviden.ce was admitted solely to
impeach a witness, and where such evidence could not have been admitted for any
other purpose, it was misconduct for the prosecutor to argue that evidence as
substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 507-08; see also Cooke v. State,
149 Idaho 233, 242-43 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Phillips, 1.44 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App.
2007).
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Admittedly though, defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's closing
argument.

Thus, this claim of error is subject to the three-part fundamental error

standard of Perry, supra. Mr. Parker contends that the Perry'standard is satisfied in this
case.
First, the misconduct at issue violated Mr. Parker's an un-waived constitutional
right-his right to a fair trial and due process of law.14 See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643.
That is because the misconduct was not a simple, meaningless misstatement on the
part of the prosecutor; as is explained fully above, it was part of a larger pattern of
getting the content of the out-of-court statements of a non-testifying alleged victim in
front of the jury, and having the jury infer that individual had SUbstantiated the State's
allegations. (See Parts I & II(A), supra.) This end-run around the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules rendered his trial unfair.
Second, the error is plain.

Preliminarily, there can be no question that it is

improper for a prosecutor, who obtained admission of a non-testifying alleged victim's
out-of-court statements based on the promise that they would not be offered for the
truth of the matters asserted therein, to then turn around and argue the truth of those
statements. See Hairston, 133 Idaho at 507-08. Further, it is clear that the failure of
defense counsel to object to the prosecutor's misconduct was not a tactical decision.
By objecting to T.S.'s alleged statements on hearsay grounds, counsel made it clear
that it was his desire to prevent those alleged statements from being admitted for their
truth. (See Tr., p.161, Ls.6-22; Tr., p.62, Ls.20-21.) Accordingly, there is no possible
tactical reason not to object when the prosecutor argued them for their truth in his
summation.

14 See U.S. CaNST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CaNST., art. I § 13.
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Finally, there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's misconduct affected
the outcome of Mr. Parker's trial. As is discussed above, it was part of a much larger
pattern of getting T.S.'s out-of-court statements in front of the jury so that the jury would
believe that T.S. had substantiated the State's allegations against Mr. Parker. As such,
the State's misconduct was extraordinarily prejudicial and, therefore, satisfies the third
prong of the Perry test.

C.

It Was Misconduct To Comment On Mr. Parker's Invocation Of His Fifth
Amendment Rights
Mr. Parker contends that the State also engaged in misconduct that had nothing

to do with its reliance on T.S.'s out-of-court statements.

One of those incidents of

misconduct was the State's comment on Mr. Parker's invocation of his Fifth Amendment
rights.
As noted above, during his second interrogation, Mr. Parker made inculpatory
statements. Thus, at trial, the State not only presented Exhibit 1, the recording of that
interrogation, but also the testimony of the two police detectives who participated in that
interrogation-Detective William Smith and Detective Moe Heatherly-both of whom
testified as to the statements Mr. Parker made during that interrogation. (See generally
Tr., p.225, L.1 - p.250, L.20 (Det. Smith); Tr., p.310, L.1 - p.337, L.19 (Det. Heatherly).)
Detective Smith was the one who commented on Mr. Parker's silence.
On direct examination, Detective Smith testified in detail as to the inculpatory
statements made by Mr. Parker during the second interrogation.

(Tr., p.235, L.5 -

p.236, L.5; Tr., p.238, Ls.1-18.) Detective Smith explained that during the first portion of
that interrogation Mr. Parker was questioned by Detective Heatherly, and it was at this
point that Mr. Parker first made inculpatory statements. (See Tr., p.233, L.23 - p.236,
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L.5.) He testified that, at some point, Detective Heatherly left the interrogation room and
he (Detective Smith) went in and took over the questioning. (See Tr., p.236, L.20 p.237, L.2.) Detective Smith testified that, in response to his questioning, Mr. Parker
essentially repeated the same inculpatory statements he had made to Detective
Heatherly.

(Tr., p.238, Ls.1-3.)

He then repeated those inculpatory statements a

second time for the jury. (Tr., p.238, Ls.3-18.) Immediately after he had done so, the
prosecutor asked: "How did the interview end?"

(Tr., p.238, L.19.)

At that point,

Detective Smith testified as follows: "As I was talking to him about these things, he said,
'I'm done.' And since I had promised him that he could leave whenever he wished to
leave, I took that as a sign that he did not want to talk to us anymore .... " (Tr., p.238,
Ls.19-25.)
Mr. Parker contends that Detective Smith's comment on his invocation of his Fifth
Amendment right to silence, seemingly elicited intentionally by the prosecutor, was
plainly improper. 15

Further, although the misconduct was not objected to at trial,

15 Even if it could be found that the prosecutor was not compficit in the Fifth Amendment
violation in this case, such a conclusion would be of no aid to the State. The Idaho
Supreme Court recently observed as follows:

To hold that a prosecutor may elicit prejudicial answers or comments on a
defendant's silence from State officers acting as witnesses by later
claiming that the officer and not the prosecutor himself supplied the
prejudicial answer, would undermine the purpose of the rules barring
misconduct during trial by superficially allowing the prosecutor to shift the
blame to the State's own representative. As a representative of the State,
Sergeant Maskell had the same duty as the prosecutor not to improperly
comment on Mr. Ellington's silence. Even more, when an officer of the
State gives any unsolicited testimony that is gratuitous and prejudicial to
the defendant, that testimony will be imputed to the State for the purposes
of determining prosecutorial misconduct. Sergeant Maskell's comment on
Mr. Ellington's silence may not have been specifically solicited by the
prosecutor, but it was undoubtedly both gratuitou$ and prejudicial to
Mr. Ellington.
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 61 (2011).
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Mr. Parker submits that it is properly considered on appeal because it satisfies the

three-part fundamental error test of Perry, supra.
First, the comment on his silence violated an un-waived Constitutional right, i.e.,
his Fifth Amendment right to silence. Pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, no
person may be compelled, in any criminal case, to be made a witness against himself.
The essence of this mandate, of course, is that, where the government "proposes to
convict and punish an individual," it must "produce the evidence against him by the
independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his
own lips." Culombe v. Connecticut, 357 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961). Thus, a suspect in a
criminal case has a constitutional right to remain silent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 467-69 (1966) (recognizing that such a right exists in holding that, under
certain circumstances, the suspect must also be "informed in clear and unequivocal
terms that he has the right to remain silent"). As a corollary to this right, he also has a
right not to have his post-Miranda silence 16 used against him at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 617-19 (1976); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291-95 (1986).
Accordingly, the Idaho courts have consistently held that it is improper for the State to
draw attention to the defendant's post-Miranda silence because its doing so runs the
risk that the jury will draw an inference of guilt from the defendant's exercise of his
constitutionally-protected right. See, e g., State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 577-79 (Ct.
App. 2005) (finding fundamental, reversible error where the defendant was crossexamined regarding his post-Miranda silence, a detective was questioned about the

16 The State's own evidence shows that, although Mr. Parker was not under arrest at
the time of his second interrogation, he had been apprised of his rights under Miranda,
supra. (See Tr., p.313, Ls.6-22.)
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defendant's post-Miranda silence, and, during the State's closing argument, the
prosecutor asked the jury to infer the defendant's guilt from his post-Miranda silence);
State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 298-99 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding error where the

prosecutor asked a police officer if he had arrested the defendant and the officer
responded with: "I Mirandized him at that point. He refused to say anything."); State v.
Strouse, 133 Idaho 709,711-14,992 P.2d 158, 160-63 (1999) (finding fundamental,

reversible error where the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant at great length
regarding his silence and then argued that such silence was indicative of the
defendant's guilt); State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104, 111-12 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding
error where the prosecutor asked a police detective what investigative steps he had
taken to obtain physical evidence and the detective replied: "I wanted to talk with him
about what had happened from his perspective. However, he chose not to talk to me");
State v. Po/and, 116 Idaho 34, 36-37 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding fundamental, reversible

error where the prosecutor elicited testimony from the prosecution's investigator to the
effect that the defendant had participated in an interview, but had terminated that
interview when she got to "the very end of the story and what happened at the incident
time and directly thereafter").

In light of these authorities, it is readily apparent that

Mr. Parker's Fifth Amendment right to silence was violated in this case.
The next question is whether the error is plain.

Mr. Parker asserts that is

because what the prosecutor and detective did in this case was plainly impermissible
under well-established United States Supreme Court arid Idaho precedent, and
because there can be no strategic reason for a defense attorney to allow the State to
ask the jury to infer guilt from the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to
silence.
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The final question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the State's
misconduct affected the outcome of the trial. Mr. Parker submits that there is. The fact
is that because the State did not call the alleged victim as a witness, its case rested
almost completely on Mr. Parker's own statements from the second interrogation. And
the veracity of those statements is highly questionable.

They were inconsistent with

prior denials made by Mr. Parker, as well as his trial testimony. (See note 2, supra.)
Further, Mr. Parker testified under oath that the inculpatory statements he made during
the second interrogation were false-the product of a long interrogation, bullying by the
police, impaired thinking because of prescription painkillers, and a desire to just have
the interrogation stop.

(See note 3, supra.)

In light of this, Mr. Parker's conviction

appears to be the product of misconduct-including the comment on Mr. Parker's
silence 17_as much as the properly-admitted trial evidence. Therefore, there is more
than a reasonable possibility that the error complained of affected the outcome of the
trial.

The prejudice specific to Detective Smith's comment on Mr. Parker's silence was
exacerbated by the fact that Detective Heatherly was later allowed to testify, seemingly
as some sort of "expert," that a suspect's failure to deny an allegation is a sign of guilt.
(See Tr., p.234, LS.7-11 (characterizing Detective Heatherly as having "some special
training in interview skills"); Tr., p.310, L.17 - p.312, L.7 (attempting to portray Detective
Heatherly as a highly qualified police officer and some sort of interrogation expert); Tr.,
p.316, L.14 - p.317, L.11 (Detective Heatherly twice asserting that an innocent person
would deny a false accusation of criminal activity).)
17
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D.

It Was Misconduct To Offer Opinion Testimony Concerning Mr. Parker's
Purported Lack Of Truthfulness And/Or His Guilt Of The Charged Offense
One of the other instances of misconduct that had nothing to do with T.S.'s out-

of-court statements was the State's proffering of opinion testimony concerning:
(a) Mr. Parker's purported lack of truthfulness during his second interrogation, and/or
(b) his purported guilt of the charged offense. This time, the improper testimony was
admitted through Detective Heatherly.
After holding Detective Heatherly up to the jury as some sort of interrogation
expert (see Tr., p.234, Ls.7-11 (characterizing Detective Heatherly as having "some
special training in interview skills"); Tr., p.310, L.17 - p.312, L.7 (attempting to portray
Detective Heatherly as a highly qualified police officer and an interrogation expert)), the
prosecutor elicited Detective Heatherly's opinion that Mr. Parker lied when he denied
having inappropriate sexual contact with T.S. The first such statement of his opinion
occurred during the following exchange:
O. When you are posing questions and thinking of questions, what
are some of the cues that you use?

What are you looking at?
What are you listening to?

A. Well, I'm looking at his body language. I'm looking at-or
listening to his verbal-words that he is saying. I am looking mostly at his
body language.

O. And during this interview, initially, what does the defendant tell
you?

A. That he has never had any type of inappropriate contact with the
victim.

O. Did you confront him on that fact?
A. Yes.
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Q. And what happens?
A. Well, when I confronted him-and I did-I told him that I knew,

100 percent, something did happen.
He said, 'Okay,' and let me continue. At that point he did not deny
the allegation.
Q. Was that a cue to you?

A. Yes.

Q. And why is that?
A. Well, because an honest or innocent person, if they are nothave not done-

MR WOLLEN [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. I believe
he is trying to give a conclusion about guilt or innocence.
THE COURT: At this point he hasn't. I will overrule the objection.
Q. BY MR VOGT [Prosecutor]: What-without commenting on it,
what were things that-why did that work as [aJ cue to you?

Why was that a cue to you, that he didn't deny when you
confronted him?
A. Because in my training an experience, SOmeone that-most
people, when they are accused of something they didn't do, will deny it.

(T r., p. 315, L. 2 3 - p. 317, L. 11 .)
Later, on cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective Heatherly if
Mr. Parker had been cooperative throughout the second interrogation.
Ls.19-20.)

(Tr., p.326,

Detective Heatherly answered the question posed, but then added a

gratuitous opinion as to Mr. Parker's truthfulness: "Well, he was being cooperative, but
he was lying to me about certain things." (Tr., p.326, Ls.21-22.)
Finally, during the prosecutor's re-direct examination, Detective Heatherly was
asked about "theme development" as an interrogation technique when he again
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commented on his perception as to Mr. Parker's truthfulness. The relevant exchange
occurred as follows:
Q. And what is your goal with these themes?

A When an individual is there and has lied to me, from what I'm
seeing, I take it that he is lying about the incident that the victim has
alleged. What I'm wanting to do is have that person begin to talk to me
about it, and I try to minimize it so that later on he will come out with the
truth.
(TL, p.336, LsA-12.)18
As the foregoing illustrates, defense counsel objected to Detective Heatherly's
opinion testimony only once.

That objection was based on the fact that Detective

Heatherly was about to offer an opinion as to the ultimate question in the caseMr. Parker's guilt or innocence-but it was overruled because Detective Heatherly had
not given the improper testimony yet. (Tr., p.3i6, L.24 - p.3i7, L.3.) However, defense
counsel failed to renew his objection seconds later when Detective Heatherly gave a
more complete improper opinion. (See Tr., p.3i7, Ls.2-15.) Further, although it could
be considered part and parcel of the objection made, Mr. Parker's counsel failed to
make a separate objection to this exchange between the prosecutor and Detective
Heatherly (or to the subsequent statements of Detective Heatherly) on the basis that
Detective Heatherly improperly opined as to Mr. Parker's truthfulness (or lack thereof).
(See Tr., p.315, L.23 - p.317, L.i5.)

To the extent that Mr. Parker's defense counsel preserved an objection to
Detective Heatherly's testimony through his single objection, Mr. Parker contends that

18 Detective Heatherly had previously testified that "minimizing" was a theme that he
uses (Tr.,p.335, Ls.i6-18), and that he had used this minimization technique in
interrogating Mr. Parker (Tr., p.329, Ls.7-11; Tr., p.332, L.24 - p.333, L.21). Thus, the
obvious inference to be drawn from this block-quoted portion of Detective Heatherly's
testimony is that Detective Heatherly believed Mr. Parker had been untruthful to him.
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the district court erred in overruling that objection. Idaho Rules of Evidence 701 and
702 govern the admission of opinion evidence. The two Rules are mutually exclusive.
Compare !.R.E. 701 (dealing with lay opinions and specifically excluding opinions
"based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledg'e within the scope of Rule
702") with !.R.E. 702 (dealing with opinions offered by witnesses qualified "as ...
expert[s] by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," and allowing such
experts to offer opinion and other testimony based on their "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge"). In this case, it appears that Detective Heatherly's testimony
was proffered as some sort of expert opinion under Rule 702. (See Tr., p.234, LS.7-11
(characterizing Detective Heatherly as having "some special training in interview skills");
Tr., p.310, L.17 - p.312, L.7 (attempting to portray Detective Heatherly as a highly
qualified police officer and an interrogation expert); Tr., p.317, LS.9-11 (Detective
Heatherly prefacing his opinion with the phrase, "in my training and experience").) In
such a case, it was not properly admitted.

As the Idaho Supreme Court recently

observed in Ellington, supra:
"Expert testimony that concerns conclusions or opinions that the average
juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the juror's common sense
and normal experience is inadmissible." [Chapman v. Chapman, 147
Idaho 756, 760 (2009).] This is because "[t]he function of the expert is to
provide testimony on subjects that are beyond the common sense,
experience and education of the average juror." Warren v. Sharp, 139
Idaho 599, 606, 83 P.3d 773, 780 (2003) (quoting Rockefeller v. Grabow,
136 Idaho 637,647,39 P.3d 577,587 (2001)).
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 66. And Ellington is not an aberration; it is wholly consistent with
the Supreme Court's prior precedent.

In State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46 (1990), for

example, the Court held that it is error to admit expert opinion testimony which contains
both "a statement of belief about the defendant's guilt or innocence, and his
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credibility.,,19 Id. at 55. Likewise, in State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520 (2003), the Court
reiterated the well-accepted principle that "an expert's opinion, in a proper case, is
admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would require the expert to
pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed evidence. To venture
beyond that point, however, is to usurp the jury's function." Id. at 525 (quoting State v.
Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696 (1988)). Thus, the fact is that in this case the jury was just

as well-equipped as Detective Heatherly to answer the question of whether Mr. Parker
was truthful in denying allegations of sexual misconduct against T.S. and, therefore,
whether he is innocent.

Accordingly, Detective Heatherly's testimony improperly

usurped the jury's role as fact-finder and should not have been admitted.
Regardless of whether this Court reviews the admission of Detective Heatherly's
as evidentiary error, Mr. Parker submits that all of the foregoing testimony-whether
elicited intentionally by the State or offered gratuitously by Detective Heatherlyconstituted misconduct.

As the Ellington Court made clear, the gratuitous and

unnecessary interjection of clearly inadmissible evidence into a case is improper, even if
not intentionally solicited by the prosecutor, because a· testifying police officer's
misconduct is imputed to the State. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 67. However, a finding of
misconduct does not end the inquiry. Because Mr. Parker's counsel did not object to
the State's misconduct, his appellate claim must be evaluated in light of the
fundamental error standard of State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
The first question under Perry is whether the misconduct violated an un-waived
constitutional right. He contends that it did; he asserts that it violated his right to a fair

19 In Walters, the credibility opinion at issue related to a statement of the defendant
made to the testifying expert during the court of that witness's investigation of the case.
See Walters, 120 Idaho at 47.
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trial and due process of law.2o

See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643.

The State propped

Detective Heatherton up as some sort of interrogation expert; Detective Heatherton
portrayed himself as a human lie detector; and Detective Heatherton repeatedly told the
jury that Mr. Parker lied when he claimed his innocence. As such, the State effectively
offered "expert" opinion testimony that Mr. Parker was guilty, thereby usurping the jury's
role as fact-finder.

Moreover, in the process, the State improperly undermined

Mr. Parker's own trial testimony, wherein he denied his guilt under oath. In light of all of
this, it cannot be said that Mr. Parker received a fair trial.
The next question under Perry is whether the error is plain. In this case, it is.
Preliminarily, Idaho law is clear that a State's witness-whether cloaked in the title of
"expert" or not-may not testify that, in his opinion, the defendant is a liar, and is guilty
of the charged offense. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 139 Idaho at 525; Walters, 120 Idaho
at 55. Moreover, there could be no strategic reason for a defense attorney to fail to
object to such testimony; there is simply nothing to be gained from allowing a police
detective to offer his personal "expert" opinion that the defendant lied when he asserted
his innocence. Besides, in this case, by objecting to Detective Heatherly's first attempt
to characterize Mr. Parker as having lied about being innocent (see Tr., p.316, L.24 p.317, L.1), defense counsel made it clear that he was not intentionally allowing this line
of testimony to proceed. 21

20 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13.
21 Mr. Parker submits that a more reasonable interpretation of defense counsel's actions
(or lack thereof) in this case is that, when he objected the first time to the State's
proffered "expert" opinion testimony concerning Mr. Parker's truthfulness, and that
objection was overruled (see Tr., p.316, L.22 - p.317, L.3), he was dissuaded from
objecting further.
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The final question under Perry is whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the State's misconduct affected the outcome of Mr. Parker's trial. Mr. Parker submits
that there is.

As discussed throughout this brief, this case turned largely on the

inculpatory statements Mr. Parker made during the second interrogation.
discussed herein, those statements were inconsistent with

Mr.

As also

Parker's prior

statements, wherein he denied any wrongdoing, and his trial testimony, wherein he not
only denied having sexual contact with T.S., but also explained that the inculpatory
statements made during the second interrogation were false-the product of a long
interrogation, bullying by the police, impaired thinking because of prescription
painkillers, and a desire to just have the interrogation stop.

In light of this, the most

critical issue in the case was whether Parker told the truth when he incriminated himself
during the second interrogation or, instead, whether he told the truth at trial. Given that
Detective Heatherly improperly offered "expert" opinion testimony on this very issue,
telling the jury that Mr. Parker lied when he claimed his innocence, there is at least a
reasonable possibility that that improper evidence affected the outcome of the trial.

E.

It Was Misconduct To Seek Mr. Parker's Conviction Based On Juror Sympathy
For The Alleged Victim And/Or Anger At Mr. Parker, Rather Than The Trial
Evidence
As discussed at length above, even though it was ultimately ruled inadmissible

by the district court, at Mr. Parker's trial, the prosecutor made much of T.S.'s alleged
"sleep talk" during a nightmare. (See Part II (A) , supra.) This nightmare, as it turns out,
was not just a vehicle to get T.S.'s "sleep talk" in front of the jury; it also provided a
convenient metaphor which allowed the prosecutor to appeal to the passions and
prejudices of the jurors. Indeed, it provided a metaphor which allowed the prosecutor to
book-end his case with emotional pleas.
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As discussed above, the prosecutor began his opening statement with the
following comments about T.8.'s literal and metaphorical nightmare:
Folks, when [T.8.] called out from his nightmare, at that point his
mother, Vanessa, knew she needed to act. 8he called the police, and that
began the charges that bring you here today.
What was the nightmare?
Well, as the police investigation unfolds, it becomes clear that the
nightmare is that the defendant, Russell Parker, sexually molested [T.8.],
a three-year-old boy. And he did that by placing the three-year-old's penis
in his mouth. And he did it more than once.
(Tr.: p.192, LS.14-22 (emphasis added).) At the end of the next day, after the jury had
heard all of the evidence in the case, the prosecutor returned to this theme, again
discussing both the literal and metaphorical nightmare allegedly suffered by T.8. He
began his summation as follows:
Folks, you have heard now the nightmare, you have heard about
the nightmare, and you know the nightmare's been in [T.8.]'s and [T.8.]'s
family life over the, basically almost a year now. No 9hild should have to
suffer this way. No kid should have to wake up from a nightmare because
of what this man did to him.
(Tr., p.38?, LS.5-12 (emphasis added).) Finally, in his very last opportunity to speak to
the jurors before they began their deliberations, the prosecutor came back to the
"nightmare" metaphor one last time; he closed the rebuttal portion of his closing
argument with the following plea: "And now it is time to hold him accountable, to end the
nightmare." (Tr., pAD?, Ls.22-23 (emphasis added).)
While the prosecutor's argument was clever, it was not proper. By referring to
the metaphorical "nightmare" suffered by T.8., and by arguing to the jury that "[n]o child
should have to suffer this way," and "[n]o kid should have to wake up from a nightmare
because of what this man did to him," the prosecutor sought to engender sympathy for
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young T.S. and/or anger at Mr. Parker; however, such pleas have no place in a
prosecutor's arguments to the jury.
The Idaho courts have long-recognized that, given the unique position of
authority and trust occupied by prosecutors, they have an overarching duty to do justice
and, thus, avoid using unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.

See, e.g., State v.

Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758,769 (1993); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980),
overruled on other grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387 (1981); State v.
Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 353-55 (1973). Indeed, more than 100 years ago, the Idaho
Supreme Court explained as follows:
"A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, 'acting in a quasi judicial
capacity.' It is his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable, and lawful
means to secure the conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted in
the courts of his judicial circuit. He should see that they have a fair and
impartial trial, and avoid convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt
him to appeal to prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or make statements
to the jury, which, whether true or not, have not been proved. The desire
for success should never induce him to endeavor to obtain a verdict by
arguments based on anything except the evidence in the case, and the
conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the same. To
convict and punish a person through the influence of prejudice and caprice
is as pernicious in its consequences as the escape of a guilty man. The
forms of law should never be prostituted to such a purpose." [Holder v.
State, 25 S.W. 279 (1894).] ...
It will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do
not look with favor upon the action of prosecutors in going beyond any
possible state of facts which can be material as to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant in a particular case for which he is upon trial. Prosecutors
too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give
more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of
the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for
the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to
see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in so
doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the
prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but
competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he
should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors,
and tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.
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State v. !twin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903) (quoted in relevant part in State v. Severson,
147 Idaho 694,715 (2009), and quoted in full in State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82,87 (Ct.
App.2007)).
In light of the foregoing, it is now well-recognized that prosecutors may not utilize
emotional appeals-whether they be appeals to sympathy, fear, anger, or any other
emotions-in their closing arguments to juries. See, e.g., Severson, 147 Idaho at 71920

(finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor's closing

argument

referenced the victim "speaking from her grave," and "arguab[e]" misconduct where the
prosecutor painted a picture of loss by the victim's family); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15,
20-21 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor's closing
argument asked the jurors to imagine themselves to be hypothetical victims of the
defendant's drunk driving); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 575-76 (Ct. App. 2007)
(finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor's closing argument highlighted
concerns about the protection of the public at-large, as well as concerns for the rights of
victims); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Here, ... the prosecutor's
appeal to the jurors' emotions was overt and express, conveying not simply that the
witness's testimony was implausible or lacking credibility, but that jurors ought to
respond to the testimony with irritation and resentment. Such appeals to emotion during
closing argument are plainly improper."); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367 (Ct. App.
1998) ("[T]he prosecutor's statement was an improper reference to the jurors' families
and hypothesized the commission of a crime against them .... This type of hypothesis
is an appeal to jurors' fears, not a "fact" proven by the evidence nor a reasonable
inference based upon the evidence. Therefore it is not a proper consideration for the
jury's decision or for counsel's argument."); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 656-57 (Ct.
42

App. 1984) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor argued that "the
entire criminal justice system" was on trial and that the jury was "the only thing standing
between the people of this community and [the defendant] robbing or doing anything
else he chooses to anyone else in the community"). Ct, e.g., State v. Ellington, 151
Idaho 53, 61-63 (2011) (finding misconduct in prosecutor's questions eliciting irrelevant
testimony about how the facts of the case were so disturbing that they caused the
State's expert to change jobs, and in unnecessarily making repetitious use of certain
inflammatory phraseology in questioning another witness); State v. Peite, 122 Idaho
809,819 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting that it is improper for a prosecutor to ask a question of
an alleged victim in order to generate sympathy for that person).
Because prosecutorial appeals to the passions and prejudices of the jury are
improper, it is readily apparent that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in this case.
Thus, the critical question is whether that un-objected to misconduct satisfies the
fundamental error standard of Perry, supra, such that it can be reviewed by this Court
on appeal.
Turning first to the question of whether the error at issue violated Mr. Parker's unwaived constitutional rights, Mr. Parker asserts that the prosecutor's improper emotional
appeals violated his right to a fair trial and due process of law. 22 See Donnelly, 416
U.S. at 643. In this case, by making the emotional appeal that he did, the prosecutor

asked the jury to convict Mr. Parker, in part, based on something other than the trial
evidence, namely, its sympathy for T.S. and its anger at Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker submits
that such an argument has obvious constitutional implications, for it is difficult to imagine
anything more antithetical to the notion of due process of law than allowing a jury to

22

See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13.
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decide a criminal case based on matters other than the trial evidence actually bearing
on the defendant's guilt or innocence. After all, it is the State's burden to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely to obtain a conviction however

it might do that
The next question is whether the misconduct was plain. It was. First, there can
be little doubt that prosecutorial appeals to the passions and prejudices of the jury are
improper.

See, e.g., Severson, 147 Idaho at 719-20.

Second, there was simply no

viable strategic reason for defense counsel to have failed to object in this case, as there
is no conceivable reason for counsel to allow the prosecutor to highlight the alleged
suffering of a young victim in a case that is already highly emotionally charged (as all
child sex abuse cases are).
The final question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that, but for the
prosecutor's misconduct, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Again,

Mr. Parker contends that there is. As has been argued throughout this brief, the State's
case turned largely on the inculpatory statements Mr. Parker made during the second
interrogation; however, those statements were of questionable veracity. In light of this,
the most critical issue in the case was whether Mr. Parker told the truth when he
incriminated himself during the second interrogation or, instead, whether he told the
truth at trial. Given this reality, there is a substantial risk that the jury was swayed by
emotion and either chose to believe the worst of Mr. Parker because of it, or simply
decided to err on the side of protecting children.
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III.
The Accumulation of Errors In This Case Deprived Mr. Parker Of A Fair Trial
"Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 230 (2010).

Thus, although Mr. Parker contends that each of the errors

cited of above were prejudicial in their own right, to the extent that this Court disagrees
and finds any of those errors to be harmless, Mr. Parker asserts that he is entitled to a
new trial nonetheless. He submits that the above errors, when aggregated, show the
absence of a fair trial in contravention of his constitutional rights.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Parker respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new tria,!.
DATED this 28 th day of March, 2013.

ERIKR. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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